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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Athletic Performance Institute, L.L.C., Utah Baseball Academy, Inc., and Robert 
Keyes, by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby file this Reply Brief on Appeal in 
this interlocutory appeal to reverse the order of the Honorable Anthony Quinn entered in this 
matter on July 22, 2009. 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
KeyBank raises the following issues for the first time on appeal which should be 
stricken: (1) The arbitration documents submitted to Judge Quinn do not involve sensitive 
arbitration information, but relate to the facts of the case (Section VII, B); (2) The Motion 
to Disqualify Judge Quinn should be denied because of the Invited Error Doctrine (Section 
XI); and (3) The Motion to Disqualify Judge Quinn did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 
63 (Section XII). Generally, this Court ,fdecline[s] to address issues that are not properly 
preserved in the district court or are raised for the first time on appeal." American Fork City 
v. Asiata, 216 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). KeyBank neither raised these 
arguments in the proceedings below nor preserved these issues for appeal. See 438 Main 
Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801, 813 (Utah 2004) ("[I]n order to preserve an issue for 
appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has 
an opportunity to rule on that issue"). Further, KeyBank did not file a cross-appeal and 
therefore cannot raise issues which have not been appealed by Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The API Parties Always Objected to Use of the Arbitration Material. 
KeyBank argues the API Parties waived their objection to disqualification of Judge 
Quinn because they failed to object to the use of arbitration materials in a timely manner. 
However, throughout their brief, KeyBank admits the API Parties have obj ected to use of the 
arbitration materials as irrelevant, prejudicial, and confidential pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-6-208 (2009) ("Utah's ADR Act"), and Reese v. Tingey Construction, 177 P.3d 605 
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(Utah 2008) (hereinafter "Tingey"). The API Parties consistently objected to KeyBankfs use 
of arbitration materials and continued to object to them throughout the Lower Court 
proceedings. Therefore, this is no basis to prevent the recusal of Judge Quinn. 
A. KeyBank Admits the API Parties Objected to Use of the 
Arbitration Material as Irrelevant and Prejudicial. 
KeyBank admits the API Parties "argued that the Arbitration materials were irrelevant 
to the issues in the present case or were prejudicial to their position ... ." (Appellees' Brief, 
p. 18.) Further, on page 22, KeyBank admits "the API Parties objected on grounds of 
relevance and prejudice ... ." {Id. at p. 22.) Despite these admissions, KeyBank claims the 
API Parties' numerous and consistent objections were not enough. 
As this Court has stated, "[a]n objection is defined [in Black's Law Dictionary] as a 
'formal statement opposing something that has occurred, or is about to occur, in court.'" 
Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325, 350 (Utah 2005) {quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 1031 
(7th ed. 1999)). The Utah Rules of Evidence require "a timely and specific objection" be 
raised before the trial court in order to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Low, 192 P.3d 
867,874 (Utah 2008); see also Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (2009). "Utah courts require specific 
objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court 
an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate."' State v. Johnson, 129 P.3d 282, 286 
(Utah Ct. App. 2006) {quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
The API Parties repeatedly objected to the arbitration material as soon as they were 
used, both on and off the record. On the record, objections first appeared in "API's 
Opposition to KeyBank's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross Motions 
2 
for Partial Summary Judgment on: 1) Breach of Contract Failure to Pay, 2) Breach of 
Covenant of Good Faith, and 3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty," filed May 27, 2008, Response 
to KeyBank's Statement of Facts, Nos. 117-119, where it states "The arbitrator's gratuitous 
dicta on this point is not relevant to this matter, and in any event not admissible as against 
Utah Baseball Academy and Mr. Keyes ...." (R. 7059.) API Parties objected to KeyBank's 
use of arbitration material in the "Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend 
Counterclaim of Athletic Performance Institute, LLC, Utah Baseball Academy, and Robert 
Keyes," filed February 12,2009 (R.l 1855); their "Objection to Amended and Supplemental 
Initial Disclosures of KeyBank National Association, Dale Conder, and Sharron Troszak," 
dated April 13, 2009 (R. 12429); a "Motion for Protective Order and Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Arbitration Proceedings, Depositions, and Award," filed April 21,2009 (R. 12445-
602); "Motion for Protective Order from Production Under Subpoena Duces Tecum to John 
Lipzinski," filed May 22, 2009 (R. 13607-614); "API Parties' Opposition to KeyBank's 
Motion to Compel Discovery by the API Parties," filed June 8, 2009 (R. 15101-128); and 
"Motion to Seal Portions of the Case File," filed June 22,2009 (R. 15270-280); and "Motion 
to Recuse Honorable Anthony B. Quinn," filed June 22, 2009. (R. 15241-269). 
Off the record, the API Parties objected to use of the arbitration material in "Utah 
Baseball Academy, Inc.; Athletic Performance Institute, LLC; Robert Keyes' Responses to 
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, and Document Requests to Plaintiffs," 
filed on August 10,2007, where the API Parties "object[] to each discovery request that seek 
information protected by any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, the work 
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product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. API does not waive any 
privilege and the reference or subsequent production of any category or item is not a waiver 
of any such privilege." (R. 2099-2100, p. 3 of pleading.) In response to KeyBank's Request 
No. 7 for "All papers filed, submitted, or served in connection with any arbitration 
proceeding between any of the API Parties and CAMCO including, without limitation, all 
claims, demands, counterclaims, counter-demands, motions, memoranda, briefs, and 
affidavits filed by any party to such arbitration proceeding," The API Parties' stated they "will 
produce all responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession at a mutually agreeable 
time and place." (Id., p. 42 of pleading.) 
The API Parties made similar objections in "Utah Baseball Academy, Inc.; Athletic 
Performance Institute, LLC; Robert Keyes' Responses to Third Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Admission, and Document Requests to Plaintiffs," filed on February 23,2009, 
where the API Parties "object to the use of the arbitration discovery, reports, and award, and 
any other documentation relating to the arbitration between Cameo and API" in their 
responses to Interrogatory No. 9, Requests for Admissions Nos. 1-62, and Request for 
Production of Documents No. 2 (R. 11935-937, pp. 11-33, 37 of pleading) and "Utah 
Baseball Academy, Inc.; Athletic Performance Institute, LLC; Robert Keyes1 Responses to 
Evergreen Synthetic Turf, LLC and Sporturf Inc.'s First set of Interrogatories Requests for 
Admission, and Document Requests to Plaintiffs," filed on February 23,2009, where the API 
Parties object to production and use of the arbitration material in their responses to 
Production of Documents Nos. 2-7. (R. 11938-940, pp. 22-23 of pleading.) 
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As KeyBank admits, the API Parties obj ected to use of the arbitration material because 
it is irrelevant, prejudicial, and inadmissible at trial. API Parties also objected to the 
arbitration material under Utah's ADR Act and Tingey. KeyBank's waiver argument is 
contradicted by KeyBank's acknowledgment and admission that API has objected to the use 
of arbitration materials. (Appellees' Brief, pp. 18, 22.) 
B. KeyBank Admits Production of the Arbitration Documents is Not 
a Waiver of Objections to Admissibility of the Documents. 
KeyBank admits, M[t]he API Parties correctly argue that 'DISCOVERABILITY is not 
the same thing as ADMISSIBILITY' and that the API Parties' production of documents from 
the Arbitration did not amount to a waiver of objections as to admissibility." (Appellees' 
Brief, p. 30.). KeyBank continues "KeyBank does not disagree with this assertion and has 
never claimed that API waived its right to object to the admissibility of Arbitration-related 
documents simply because the API Parties produced them in discovery." (Id. at pp. 30-31.) 
KeyBank has admitted the API Parties never waived any objection to use of the arbitration 
materials by producing the material in discovery, and there should be no controversy on this 
point. Nevertheless, KeyBank argues that because API Parties disclosed the names of the 
court reporters for the arbitration during discovery, the API Parties have now waived the 
argument against admissibility. Withholding that information was not something API Parties 
could do under the Rule 26 of Civil Procedure, where the broad scope allows discovery of 
even irrelevant material if it may lead to discovery of admissible evidence. 
Rule 26 states, "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ...." Utah R. Civ. P 
5 
26(b)(1) (2009). ,fIt is not ground for objection that the information sought will be 
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence." Id. "The mere fact that [the arbitration material] might 
be discoverable does not automatically mean that [it is] admissible into evidence. Thus, 
while the [arbitration evidence] may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, it does not 
necessarily follow that [it is itself] admissible.ff Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical 
Center, 121 P.3d 74, n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 2005); see also In re: Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 
568 F.3d 1180,1189 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tenth Circuit unwilling to expand the scope of trial 
admissibility to the same breadth as discoverability). Just because API Parties provided 
discoverable documents, it does not follow that they are thereby made admissible. 
Despite the agreement of the parties on this issue, Judge Quinn denied the "Motion 
to Recuse the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn Under Reese v. Tingey Construction" because 
he concluded the API Parties waived any objection by producing arbitration material in 
discovery. (R. 16069, 6:5-7:6.) Respectfully, Judge Quinn must be reversed on this point. 
See LMIns. Corp. v. Sourceone Groupt Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 727, 739-40 (N.D. 111. 2006) 
(Submitting information, even privileged information, during discovery does not constitute 
waiver). It was error for Judge Quinn to use the production of arbitration materials as a basis 
to consider the arbitration materials over API Parties1 objection. KeyBank acknowledges 
Judge Quinn not only reviewed the arbitration materials, but used them to deny API's Motion 
to Amend the Counterclaim. KeyBank admits he used "the deposition of Clark Smith taken 
in the arbitration" and he "relied on that deposition[.]" (Appellees' Brief, p. 21, point 4.) 
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C. The API Parties Defensively Raised the Arbitration Matters in 
Direct Response to KeyBank's Offensive Use of the Arbitration 
Evidence. 
KeyBank argues the API Parties filed pleadings involving the arbitration material with 
the Lower Court and argues those API pleadings cause a waiver. (Appellees* Brief, pp. 8-
10.) However, KeyBank fails to distinguish how the API Parties used the arbitration 
information with the Lower Court. All references to arbitration materials were directly 
related to the API Parties1 objections of the arbitration evidence or an attempt to limit the 
introduction of arbitration information into evidence. The API Parties only referred to the 
arbitration material because they were forced to do so after KeyBank filed the material with 
the Lower Court and relied on it to challenge the API Parties' claims. 
KeyBank cites to the API Parties1 "Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Amend Counterclaim of Athletic Performance Institute, LLC, Utah Baseball 
Academy, and Robert Keyes,,f filed on February 12, 2009, claiming the API Parties 
attached the Final Arbitration Award to the memorandum and discussed Clark Smith's 
deposition. (Appellees1 Brief, pp. 8,10.) However, KeyBank tactically ignores that 
KeyBank first discussed confidential material from the arbitration, namely, the 
deposition testimony of Clark Smith from the arbitration, and attached it as Exhibit 
7 to "KeyBank's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend Counterclaim of 
Athletic Performance Institute, L.L.C., Utah Baseball Academy, Inc., and Robert 
Keyes," filed on February 5,2009. (R. 11649-650; 11745-749.) The API Parties only 
referenced the Final Arbitration Award to object to its use, stating "Clark Smith's 
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deposition from the arbitration should not be used in connection with this proceeding 
against KeyBank, as the arbitration relates only to the narrow issue of Cameo's 
damages." (R. 11855.) KeyBank's reference to confidential arbitration material 
forced the API Parties to defensively use arbitration information to show the Lower 
Court that such evidence must not be used. 
KeyBank cites to the API Parties1 "Objection to Amended and Supplemental Initial 
Disclosures of KeyBank National Association, Dale Conder, and Sharron Troszak," 
dated April 13, 2009, claiming the API Parties quoted from the arbitrator's ruling. 
(Appellees' Brief, p. 8.) Again, KeyBank's argument is misleading. The API Parties' 
pleading was an objection to KeyBank's use of the arbitration information. KeyBank's 
"Amended and Supplemental Initial Disclosures of KeyBank National Association, 
Dale Conder, and Sharron Troszak," filed on April 1, 2009, stated that KeyBank 
intended to rely on "Certain documents [that] may have been produced and/or filed 
in connection with the arbitration involving Cameo Construction, Inc " (R. 
12418-420, p. 22 of the pleading.) The API Parties promptly objected to use of the 
confidential arbitration material as "irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and likely to 
confuse the jury." (R. 12429.) The reference by the API Parties to the arbitration 
material was an objection in direct response to KeyBank's inappropriate use and 
disclosure of such information, with the specific intent to rely on it at trial. (Id.) 
KeyBank cites to the API Parties' "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective 
Order and Motion in Limine to Exclude Arbitration Proceedings, Depositions, and 
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Award/1 filed on April 21,2009, and claims the API Parties attached and relied on the 
Final Arbitration Award. (Appellees' Brief, p. 9.) Again, KeyBank misleads this 
Court and fails to explain the pleading was a Motion for Protective Order to stop 
KeyBank's disclosure of confidential arbitration material. In the API Parties' 
Memorandum, the API Parties state M[t]he arbitration proceedings, including any 
discovery and evidence, should be protected from use as evidence in this case and 
excluded from trial ... [because] it is irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and likely to 
confuse the jury." (R. 12451-452.) The API Parties asked the Lower Court to protect 
the confidential nature of the arbitration material and only raised the arbitration 
materials in the context of motion for protective order because KeyBank continued 
to file arbitration material with the Lower Court. That motion remains pending before 
the Court. (R. 16022.) 
KeyBank cites to "API's Opposition to KeyBank's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Support of Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on: 1) Breach of Contract 
Failure to Pay, 2) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith, and 3) Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty," filed on May 27, 2008, claiming the API Parties cite to the Final Arbitration 
Award and describe the bifurcation in arbitration. (Appellees' Brief, pp. 9-10.) 
Again, KeyBank intentionally misleads this Court and fails to explain that the API 
Parties referenced the arbitration material because KeyBank referred to it and attached 
arbitration documents to "KeyBank's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment," filed April 30, 2008. (R. 4944-5039.) Specifically, KeyBank 
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attached the Arbitrator's Final Decision and Award as Exhibit 31 (R. 5217-26); 
discussed the arbitration in their Undisputed Fact Nos. 117-119 (R. 4984-86); and 
discussed the arbitration in their argument, stating "Cameo had no responsibility for 
the elevation differential between the surface of the turf and the surface of the 
basketball court, and the Arbitrator later determined that Cameo was correct." (R. 
5005.) KeyBank also attached arbitration documents to the "Affidavit of Clark 
Smith," as Exhibits A, B, and C. (R. 4770-92.) In response, the API Parties only 
discussed the arbitration because they were forced to do so, stating "[t]he arbitrator's 
gratuitous dicta on this point is not relevant to this matter, and in any event not 
admissible as against Utah Baseball Academy and Mr. Keyes ... ." (R. 7059.) 
KeyBank's repeated use of arbitration material and testimony, forced the API Parties 
to discuss the arbitration to preserve their rights. 
KeyBank cites to the API Parties' "Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Protective Order and Motion in Limine to Exclude Arbitration Proceedings, 
Depositions, and Award," filed May 18, 2009, claiming the API Parties filed 
affidavits from their counsel in the arbitration testifying to the scope and issues in the 
arbitration. (Appellees' Brief, p. 10.) What KeyBank correctly states is the API 
Parties stated they "cite to the arbitrator's award in this motion and all preceding or 
subsequent motions for illustrative purposes only" and "not to introduce it as evidence 
in this case, but only to show the arbitrator reserved all issues not relating to the 
construction contract between API and Cameo for the Court." (R. 13311, n. 1.) 
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Again, the API Parties only cited to the arbitration evidence because they were forced 
to do so by KeyBank. The API Parties filed for a protective order to exclude the 
arbitration material because KeyBank repeatedly used it in their pleadings. 
KeyBank misstates the matter when claiming the API Parties introduced arbitration 
material to the Lower Court. KeyBank neglects to disclose the API Parties only discussed 
the arbitration material to object to KeyBank1 s use. Each time API Parties were responding 
to something KeyBank filed or discussed from the arbitration. KeyBank repeatedly discussed 
confidential arbitration material in KeyBank's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 4944-
5039), Amended and Supplemental Initial Disclosures (R. 12418-420, p. 22 of pleading), and 
Opposition to the API Parties'Motion to Amend Counterclaim. (R. 11649-650; 11745-749.) 
The API Parties tried to preserve the confidentiality of the arbitration, but necessarily 
referred to arbitration in order to make their objections. KeyBank's argument that objecting 
to it refers to it, and thereby waives the objection is a complete non-sequitur. 
D. Confidentiality in Arbitration May Only be Waived According to 
Statute. 
KeyBank takes the extraordinary position that the API Parties waived any objection 
to confidentiality of the arbitration evidence by allegedly failing to obj ect in a timely manner. 
(Appellees' Brief, p. 22-24.) However, the Utah ADR Act specifies how a party may waive 
confidentiality. Utah's ADR Act states "ADR proceedings shall be closed unless the parties 
agree that the proceedings be open." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-208(l). It continues: 
"[u]nless all parties and the neutral agree, no person attending an ADR proceeding, including 
the ADR provider or ADR organization, may disclose or be required to disclose any 
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information obtained in the course of an ADR proceeding, including any memoranda, notes, 
records, or work product." Id. at § 78B-6-208(4). 
Utah's ADR Act give the specific procedures required to waive the confidential 
protection for ADR material. It states the actual ADR proceedings will be closed unless the 
parties agree, and that nothing, evidence or otherwise, from ADR proceedings may be 
disclosed "[ujnless all the parties and the neutral agree." Id. The Act says nothing about 
permissive waiver through a subsequent failure to object. Instead it specifies the exact 
procedures parties must follow to waive confidentiality in ADR proceedings. See Tingey 
at 608 ("A statutory exception to the general rule of confidentiality is where all parties to the 
mediation and the mediator agree to disclose information obtained during the mediation11); 
see also Eisendrath v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (Holding that absent an express waiver by both parties, as prescribed by statute, 
mediation confidentiality cannot be waived). Thus, failure to object cannot be a basis for 
waiving confidentiality. The only way the API Parties could have waived confidentiality 
would be for API, Cameo, and the Arbitrator to agree in writing. This never occurred. There 
is no waiver. 
Finally, as a practical matter a "waiver" should never occur in any case without a 
written agreement as the statute requires. Outside of that, the argument of a "waiver" would 
require the trial judge to consider arbitration materials in order to reach his decision. So the 
judge becomes contaminated by the material before he is able to decide the question. Hence 
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the wisdom of the statute establishing the necessity to first have a knowing, written waiver 
precede any consideration of arbitration material by any Court. 
II. Tingey Applies Equally to Mediation and Arbitration Because Utah's 
ADR Act Requires it and the Policy Reasons Behind Confidentiality in 
Mediation Apply to Arbitration. 
KeyBank argues Tingey only applies to mediation because mediation and arbitration 
are inherently different and arbitration is not entitled to the same protections as mediation. 
(Appellees' Brief, pp. 28-37.) However, KeyBank ignores the language of Utah's ADR Act, 
which states all ADR proceedings, including mediation and arbitration, are confidential. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-208(l) (2009). Further, the policy reasons behind promoting 
confidentiality in mediation apply equally to arbitration, particularly in this case, where 
KeyBank causes mischief by attempting to use information from a narrow arbitration 
proceeding to prejudice the API Parties. The policy reasons underlying the need for 
confidentiality for arbitration in addition to mediation include the following: 
A. The Confidentiality Provisions of Utah's ADR Act Apply to All 
ADR Proceedings, Including Arbitration. 
KeyBank argues Utah's ADR Act does not apply to this case because it is not the 
"same case ... between the same parties." (Appellees1 Brief, pp. 37-45.) Specifically, 
KeyBank argues they are not bound by the Act because they did not participate in the 
arbitration nor learn of any evidence during an ADR proceeding. (Id. at pp. 41-45.) 
However, KeyBank ignores the language of the ADR Act and sidesteps the purposes of the 
Act with their skewed analysis. 
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As Utah law states," ADR proceedings shall be conducted in a manner that encourages 
informal and confidential exchange among the persons present... ADR proceedings shall 
be closed unless the parties agree that the proceedings be open.M Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
208(1) (2009). The term "ADR" means alternative dispute resolution and "includes 
arbitration, mediation, and other means of dispute resolution ....M Id., §78B-6- 202 (1) 
(emphasis added). "'Arbitration' means a private hearing before a neutral or panel of 
neutrals who hear the evidence, consider the contentions of the parties, and enter a written 
award to resolve the issues ...." Id., § 78B-6-202(4) (emphasis added). 
Utah's ADR Act applies equally to mediation and arbitration, and requires all ADR 
proceedings to remain confidential. Further, the Act defines "arbitration" as a "private 
hearing." Id. The fact the Legislature did not make a distinction between the confidentiality 
of mediation and arbitration shows the intent of the Legislature to keep both confidential. 
KeyBank fails to even address this ADR Act provision. Instead they argue the opposite, 
completely contradicting the confidentiality provisions of Utah's ADR Act. KeyBank's 
interpretation is contrary to the language and purposes of the ADR Act. 
Because Utah's ADR Act applies the confidentiality requirement to all ADR 
proceedings, it follows that Tingey applies to arbitration as well. Tingey interprets Utah's 
ADR Act and applies it in the context of mediation. However, Utah's ADR Act does not 
distinguish between confidentiality in mediation and arbitration. Therefore, Tingey applies 
to arbitration. The reasons for encouraging confidentiality in mediation and requiring the 
recusal of any trial judge who learns of mediation discussions apply equally to arbitration 
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because Utah's ADR Act does not distinguish between the two. Both are confidential. Both 
are alternative dispute resolution procedures adopted as alternatives to traditional litigation, 
and both are included in Utah's ADR Act. Therefore, this Court's concern "in the context of 
the statutory mandate of confidentiality, by the ease with which the parties and the trial court 
discussed mediation communications" applies equally to this case. Tingey at 611. KeyBank 
failed to address arbitration cases which prohibit using arbitration evidence in subsequent 
judicial proceedings. (See API's Opening Brief, pgs. 33-34). 
The admonition in Tingey to "put future litigants and courts on notice.that the statutory 
bar [of confidentiality] is to be carefully observed" should remain the law to preserve the 
intent of Utah's ADR Act. Id. Therefore, as in Tingey, this Court should order "the portions 
of the record disclosing confidential [arbitration] information sealed and further order that 
[Judge Quinn] recuse [himself] from further proceedings." Id. 
B. The Policy Reasons Behind Mediation Apply Equally to 
Arbitration (However, Mediation Materials Were Also Present and 
Used in the Arbitration of This Case). 
KeyBank argues the policies of confidentiality in mediation do not apply to 
arbitration, which is an adversarial, adjudicative proceeding. (Appellees' Brief, p. 28.) 
KeyBank continues the "purpose of nonbinding mediation is to promote compromise and 
settlement. The purpose of binding arbitration (like litigation in court) is to determine who 
is right and who is wrong." (Id.) However, the policy reasons for confidentiality in ADR 
proceedings under Utah's ADR Act and Tingey apply equally to mediation and arbitration 
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because both are alternative dispute resolution procedures and both deserve the protections 
of confidentiality, particularly in this context. 
Utah's ADR Act is a legislative rule, not a judicial creation. It was adopted to: 
"offer an alternative or supplement to the formal processes associated with a 
court trial and to promote the efficient and effective operation of the courts of 
this state by authorizing and encouraging the use of alternative methods of 
dispute resolution to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
civil actions ...." 
Id. at §78B-6-203(l). The Legislature found "ADR procedures will reduce the need for 
judicial resources and the time and expense of the parties." Id. at §78B-6-203(2)(c). The 
"preservation of the confidentiality of ADR procedures will significantly aid in the successful 
resolution of civil actions in a just, speedy and inexpensive matter." Id., §78B-6-203(2)(b). 
In Tingey, this Court ruled the confidentiality provision of the Utah ADR Act prevents 
communications made in ADR proceedings from becoming evidence. Tingey, at 608-09. 
The policy reasons behind the confidentiality of ADR proceedings are clear: 
"Confidentiality of all communications between the parties or among them and 
the mediator serves the important public policy of promoting a broad 
discussion of potential resolutions to the matters being mediated." Wilmington 
Hospitality, L.L.C. v. New Castle County, 788 A.2d 536, 541 (Del.Ch. 2001). 
This candid exchange of information and ideas can be achieved only when the 
parties are assured that their communications will be protected from 
postmediation disclosure. 
The guarantee of confidentiality permits and encourages counsel to discuss 
matters in an uninhibited fashion often leading to settlement... If participants 
cannot rely on the confidential treatment of everything that transpires during 
these sessions then counsel of necessity will feel constrained to conduct 
themselves in a cautious, tightlipped, noncommittal manner more suitable to 
poker players in a high-stakes game than to adversaries attempting to arrive at 
a just resolution of a civil dispute. This atmosphere if allowed to exist would 
surely destroy the effectiveness of a program which has led to settlements and 
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withdrawals of some appeals and to the simplification of issues in other 
appeals, thereby expediting cases at a time when the judicial resources of this 
Court are sorely taxed. Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 
608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir.1979) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
Id. at 607-08. 
The same policy reasons apply to arbitration, particularly in this case, where the 
proceedings were bifurcated and only two parties in multi-party litigation were sent to 
arbitration.1 Here, there were originally ten parties to the lawsuit: Cameo, API, UBA, 
Robert Keyes, KeyBank, Sporturf, Evergreen Synthetic, Monarch Contracting & Design, 
Cannon Sales, Inc., and Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. (R. 1-12; 1026-63; 1441-1527.) 
However, early in the litigation, Cameo filed a "Motion to Stay Proceedings," asking the 
Lower Court to compel the API Parties and Cameo to attend arbitration. (R. 13-76.) The 
Lower Court granted Cameo's request over the API Parties' objection, and bifurcated the 
action sending only API, UBA, and Cameo to arbitration2. (R. 1023-24.) The arbitrator 
dismissed UBA as a party, leaving only Cameo and API. 
At arbitration, Cameo demanded payment from API. API demanded Cameo finish 
performance of the construction project. Cameo claimed its performance was excused due 
1
 What KeyBank also fails to explain is that API and Cameo attended mediation 
before the arbitration. Much of the mediation information was used at arbitration, including 
memoranda and notes. The parties never waived confidentiality of the mediation 
information, but agreed to use the information in the arbitration. 
2
 Mr. Keyes was not required to attend arbitration because he was initially dismissed 
from the case. (R. 321-23.) However, Mr. Keyes is currently a party to this litigation since 
filing a counterclaim against KeyBank. (R. 1441-1527.) Additionally, the Arbitrator 
dismissed UBA from the arbitration, finding only Cameo and API were parties to the 
construction contract. 
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to API's refusal to pay. API claimed without Cameo's full performance, it had no obligation 
to pay. However, what was missing from the arbitration were the other essential parties, 
namely KeyBank, Sporturf, and Evergreen Synthetic. The only way API could satisfy 
Cameo's demand for payment was from their construction loan with KeyBank. KeyBank 
claimed there was no money remaining in the loan, even though over $400,000 was still 
undrawn. Not only that, KeyBank told Cameo that API had not approved payment. API not 
only had approved payment, they had requested at least six times for payment to be made. 
KeyBank's refusal to pay, and lie to Cameo that API did not intend to pay, caused the 
arbitration dispute in the first place. API was unable to bring KeyBank into the hearing to 
explain why it refused to pay Cameo. Similarly, API demanded performance from Cameo, 
including repair of the defective basketball court and synthetic turf. Cameo was unable to 
look to Sporturf to explain why the product was defective. Thus, the arbitration forced 
Cameo and API to argue without participation from the funding bank or the turf-installing 
subcontractor. The two parties in arbitration presented so truncated a view of the matter as 
to be entirely distorted from the fuller view to be presented in the trial of this case. 
The Lower Court first erred by sending some, but not all parties to an arbitration 
proceeding where some, but not all of the facts would be heard. Had all parties been 
involved in the arbitration with all the issues presented, the Arbitrator would have had a 
complete understanding of all the facts, parties and the respective roles and responsibilities 
in the construction project and its funding. When Cameo demanded payment of API, API 
could have looked to KeyBank and allowed KeyBank to answer, explain, and account for 
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why payment was refused. KeyBank, as APIfs lender on the construction loan, was directly 
involved in not paying Cameo because they refused to release funds, falsely claiming there 
were no funds remaining in the loan. Their story has changed many times since then and, 
after arbitration proceedings were underway, they adopted the story that Camco?s work was 
defective and payment was not appropriate. However, KeyBank's own inspector reviewed 
Cameo's construction work and approved payment. KeyBank's changes to their story are 
driven in part by what they now think they may be able to get away with telling a jury 
because of the arbitration, in contrast to what they were saying at the time. The Vice 
President who had used API loan proceeds to pay his personal bills was put in charge of 
administering the loan. He told API there were no funds remaining. He told Cameo that API 
had not approved payment, even though API had repeatedly requested payment. KeyBankfs 
Vice president "lost" (or destroyed) the pay request. By his manipulation, KeyBank's Vice 
President caused the arbitration between Cameo and API, which KeyBank now wants to 
exploit to their advantage in defending the damages caused to the API Parties. 
API had no control over KeyBank's refusal to provide payment, yet, in the arbitration, 
API was unable to have KeyBank account for their refusal to pay Cameo. Thus, the 
Arbitrator only heard a very narrow and severely-limited picture of what happened to the 
construction project. The arbitration omitted indispensable parties and indispensable claims 
to a full resolution of this case. Thus, the case is left divided, with KeyBank wanting to use 
severely-limited arbitration material tactically against the API Parties' claims. 
19 
Furthermore, much of the documentation ultimately used in the arbitration between 
Cameo and API was obtained during mediation preceding the arbitration. The mediation 
materials became part of the arbitration, and therefore, as a practical matter, KeyBank's 
attempted distinction between the two will not work in this case. The information KeyBank 
seeks to rely upon and presented to Judge Quinn for his consideration, includes materials 
originated during mediation. 
This is the exact mischief the Legislature, through Utah's ADR Act, meant to prevent 
by requiring all ADR proceedings to be confidential. Because the Legislature made no 
distinction between confidentiality of mediation and arbitration, arbitration proceedings must 
be confidential. Arbitration is confidential to guard against the unfairness inherent in a 
bifurcated proceeding, where only two parties in a multiple-party suit are ordered to arbitrate 
their limited dispute. The Legislature was determined to keep arbitration confidential 
because of the distorted outcome and distorted view that can occur. As Utah's ADR Act 
makes clear, arbitration was meant to be a quick, informal, and final alternative to litigation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-203(l) (2009). By proceeding to arbitration, parties get a quick, 
informal and final result at the price of forfeiting rules of procedure, rules of evidence, and 
witness competence. Therefore, the precise reasons for requiring confidentiality in mediation 
equally apply to confidentiality in arbitration. Both are alternative dispute resolution forums 
and both are entitled to confidentiality. Because the Lower Court has been contaminated 
with confidential arbitration material, Judge Quinn must be recused to preserve the 
confidentiality of ADR proceedings and the integrity of this case. 
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III. KeyBankfs Plea to Use Part of the "Non-Sensitive" Arbitration Evidence 
Has Been Rejected by the Court. 
KeyBank claims the arbitration materials should be used because they do not contain 
"the kinds of sensitive things that were at issue in Tingey Construction." (Appellees' Brief, 
pg. 33). This case-by-case analysis has been rejected in prior decisions by the Court. 
In Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004), the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
a "bright-line approach" prohibiting the preclusive effect of an arbitration decision on 
subsequent litigation unless the parties have expressly so agreed. Id. at 850. The Utah 
Supreme Court specifically rejected the case-by-case approach where courts are required to 
examine the extent to which the arbitration proceedings in a particular case gave the parties 
the opportunity to present evidence and argument in a manner substantially similar to that 
provided in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 849. This Court stated: "[w]hile arbitration should 
be encouraged, the benefits derived from its more relaxed procedures can be undermined if 
third parties are permitted to invoke the theory of collateral estoppel for its results without 
prior agreement by the parties." Id. at 850. In reaching this conclusion, the Utah Supreme 
Court relied on the California Supreme Court reasoning in Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 
982 P.2d 229, 242-43 (1999). 
First, refusing to give preclusive effect to arbitration decisions does not undermine 
judicial integrity because arbitration decisions are "outside the judicial system." Id. This 
reason alone should prevent use of the arbitration evidence in the proceeding below. The 
information obtained from a source "outside the judicial system" should not be given a 
judicial stamp of approval or even the appearance of credibility. Second, because arbitration 
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does not require the use of a courtroom or judge, subsequent adjudication "does not 
undermine judicial economy by requiring duplication of judicial resources to decide the same 
issue." Id. Third, denying nonmutual collateral estoppel effect does not protect parties from 
harassment by vexatious litigation. Instead, it only prevents a third party from "gain[ing] 
vicarious advantage from a litigation victory won by another." Id. This is exactly what 
KeyBank is seeking to do. Finally, in light of the contractual nature of arbitration, the parties 
to arbitration should be the ones who determine any subsequent preclusive effect of 
arbitration proceedings. Id. The API Parties never agreed to make arbitration binding in 
subsequent litigation with KeyBank or any other third party. 
The case-by-case approach suggested by KeyBank was rejected Tingey. In Tingey, 
the Utah Supreme Court discussed the trial court's attempt to distinguish between 
"confidential and non-confidential" mediation discussions. Id. This Court rejected that 
approach and enumerated the reasons supporting the complete confidentiality of the ADR 
process. Tingey, at 607-608. 
This Court should not accept KeyBankfs invitation to overrule either Buckner or 
Tingey. Nor should the Court believe KeyBank's assertion that it did not argue below that 
the "Final Arbitration Award has any preclusive effect on any of the API Parties." (See 
Appellees' Brief, p. 48). In reality, and in utter contradiction to the foregoing assertion, 
KeyBank asserted below that "[a]ny and all claims against KeyBank, Troszak and Conder 
as described in the API Counterclaim are barred by the arbitration and resulting award 
between the API Parties and Cameo." (Appellees' Brief, p. 18; see also R. 1954). Buckner 
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prevents the use of arbitration materials to bar claims in judicial proceedings. Tingey 
requires removal of a judge who, like Judge Quinn, uses evidence from non-judicial 
proceedings, such as arbitration. As a result, Judge Quinn must be disqualified. 
IV. The Use of The Final Arbitration Award is Appropriate for Purposes of 
Confirming the Award. 
KeyBank incorrectly characterizes the API Parties' argument as prohibiting the use 
of the final arbitration award in the Lower Court. KeyBank also claims API Parties' 
reference to the Final Arbitration Award in the proceeding below defeats this appeal. 
(Appellees' Brief, p. 43). The API Parties do not dispute the statutes contemplate filing an 
arbitration award with the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-206; see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11-123 (2009). Filing permits collection of the award, and no other purpose. 
The statutes do not authorize KeyBank to contaminate the record with arbitration depositions, 
affidavits, testimony, and expert reports. The purpose for filing the final arbitration award 
is to use judicial means to enforce the award. The reasoning of the arbitrator is irrelevant to 
enforcing the award. Only the award amount is relevant. 
The Utah Arbitration Act "'reflects long-standing public policy favoring speedy and 
inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes.'" Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, 
Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996) {quoting AUred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 909 P.2d 
1263, 1265 (Utah 1996)). And "[i]n order to make the proceedings fair, expeditious, and 
cost-effective," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-118(2) (2009), the Arbitration Act confers upon 
arbitrators broad discretion regarding discovery matters and substantially limits judicial 
review of arbitration awards. See generally Id. § 78B-11-118,-124; Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d 
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at 947 ("[judicial review of arbitration awards should not be pervasive in scope or 
encourage repetitive adjudications but should be limited to the statutory grounds and 
procedures for review" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Accordingly, trial courts are only permitted to vacate an arbitration if (a) the award was 
procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (b) there was: (i) evident partiality by 
an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; (ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or (iii) 
misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (c) 
an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for 
postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise 
conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to substantially prejudice the 
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's 
authority; (e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the 
arbitration proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78B-11-116(3) not later 
than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or (f) the arbitration was conducted without 
proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to 
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11-124(1) (2009). 
In applying these statutory provisions, M[t]he trial court may not substitute its judgment 
for that of the arbitrator, nor may it modify or vacate an award because it disagrees with the 
arbitrator's assessment." Softs olutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, 1099 
(Utah 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the trial court's standard of 
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review "is an extremely narrow one, . . . setting aside the arbitrator's decision only in certain 
narrow circumstances." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, final awards 
are filed with the trial court for the very limited purpose of confirming the award and using 
judicial means to enforce the award. KeyBank's actions in the proceeding below exceeded 
the scope of the statutory authority to file final arbitration awards. KeyBank's use of 
arbitration depositions, affidavits, testimony, and expert reports presented in the arbitration 
proceeding was inappropriate and clearly not authorized by the applicable arbitration statutes. 
Because KeyBankhas contaminated Judge Quinn with the arbitration materials, Judge Quinn 
should be disqualified under Tingey. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and the law, Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully 
request this Court reverse the error of the Third District Court and mandate the recusal of the 
Honorable Judge Anthony Quinn. 
DATED this [ 9 day of March, 2010 
ER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
BretW.RkjcH 7 
Daniel B.oamdtt 
Tahnee L. Hamilton 
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